

Globalization and the research imagination*

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1. Introduction

The word 'globalization' today provokes heated reactions. Some of these reactions are about definitions. Others are about whether globalization, whatever it is, has gone too far or not far enough. Yet other debates are founded on the officialization of the term globalization and its conversion into the slogan of the new forces that support liberalization, marketization and 'reform' across the world. This slogan and its associated zealots have produced much fear in the countries of the South who fear that globalization is simply a new name for the empire of Northern capital.

While I do not address these debates in this article, I do make some initial assumptions. I take it that globalization is inextricably linked to the current workings of capital on a global basis, that in this regard it extends the earlier logics of empire, trade and political dominion in many parts of the world. Its most striking feature is the runaway quality of global finance that appears remarkably independent of traditional constraints of information-transfer, national regulation, industrial productivity or 'real' wealth in any particular society, country or region. The worrisome implications of this chaotic, high-velocity, promiscuous movement of financial (especially speculative) capital have been noted by several

astute critics (Greider, 1997; Rodrik, 1997; Soros, 1998, among others) so I will not dwell on them here. I also agree with those analysts who are inclined to see globalization as a definite marker of a new crisis for the sovereignty of nation-states, even if there is no consensus on the core of this crisis or its generality and finality (Appadurai, 1996; Rosenau, 1997; Ruggie, 1993; Sassen, 1996).

My principal concern in this article will be the relationship between globalization and current forms of critical knowledge, especially as these forms have come to be organized by the social sciences in the West. Here we need to observe some optical peculiarities, which I will elaborate in subsequent sections. The first is that there is a growing disjuncture between the globalization of knowledge and the knowledge of globalization. The second is that there is an

inherent temporal lag between the processes of globalization and our efforts to contain them conceptually. The third is that globalization as an uneven economic process creates a fragmented and uneven distribution of those resources for learning, teaching and cultural criticism which are most vital for the formation of democratic research communities which could produce a global view of globalization. That is, globalization resists the possibility of the production of forms of collaboration

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that might make it easier to understand or criticize.

In an earlier, more confident epoch in the history of social science, notably in the 1950s and 1960s during the zenith of modernization theory, such epistemological diffidence would have been quickly dismissed, since that was a period of a more secure sense of the relationship between theory, method and location in the social sciences. Theory and method were seen as naturally metropolitan, modern and Western. The rest of the world was seen in the idiom of cases, events, examples, and test-sites in relation to this stable location for the production or revision of theory. Most varieties of Marxist theory, though sharply critical of the capitalist project behind modernization theory, nevertheless were equally 'realist', both in their picture of the architecture of the world-system and in their understanding of the relationship between theory and cases. Thus much excellent work in the Marxist tradition had no special interest in problems of voice, perspective or location in the study of global capitalism. In short, a muscular objectivism united much social science in the three decades after the Second World War, whatever the politics of the practitioners.

Today, one does not have to be a postmodernist, relativist, or deconstructionist (key words in the culture wars of the Western academic world) to admit that political subjects are not mechanical products of their objective circumstances, that the link between events significantly separated in space and proximate in time is often hard to explain; that the kinds of comparison of social units that relied on their empirical separability cannot be secure; and that the more marginal regions of the world are not simply producers of data for the theory mills of the North.

To begin an engagement with the emergent links between globalization and knowledge about globalization, and to propose a way to think about new forms of epistemic collaboration across regions and cultural spheres, I briefly review some ideas about the role of the imagination in the contemporary world.

2. The logic of globalization

In *Modernity at Large: Cultural Dimensions of Globalization* (Appadurai, 1996), I made some

arguments about the cultural dimensions of globalization. One of the assumptions was that while contact between regions, cultures and societies is surely nothing new, our current era of globalization is marked by a set of features which set it off even from the world systems of the imperial world of the last few centuries. What is new about this era clearly has a lot to do with the workings of global capital, but since we do not yet know very much about how capital really works *globally*, this characterization only shifts the question.

Closer to the mark is the observation – more fully argued in the book – that electronic mediation and mass migration create a new force field for social relations globally. Looked at from the point of view of the nation-state, we stand on the edge of a global order characterized by the emergence of a large number of forces which constrain, erode or otherwise violate the workings of national sovereignty in the domains of economics, law and political allegiance. The epoch of the nation-state may not yet be at an end, but the era in which the system of nation-states was the only game in town, as far as international governance and transnational political traffic are concerned, is surely over.

Further, we are functioning in a world that is fundamentally characterized by objects in motion. These objects include ideas and ideologies, people and goods, images and messages, technologies and techniques. This is a world of flows. It is also of course a world of structures, organizations and other stable social forms. But the apparent stabilities that we see are, under close examination, usually our devices for handling objects characterized by motion. The greatest of these apparently stable objects is the nation-state, which is today everywhere characterized by floating populations, transnational politics within national borders and mobile configurations of technology and expertise.

But to say that globalization is about a world of things in motion somewhat understates the point. The various flows we see – of objects, persons, images and discourses – are not coeval, convergent, isomorphic or spatially consistent. They are in relations of disjuncture. By this I mean that the paths or vectors taken by these various kinds of things have different speeds, different axes, different points of origin and

termination, and different relationships to institutional structures in different regions, nations or societies. Further, these disjunctures themselves precipitate various kinds of problems and frictions in different local situations. Indeed, it is the disjunctures between the various vectors that characterize this world-in-motion that produce fundamental problems of livelihood, equity, suffering, justice and governance.

Examples include: media flows across national boundaries that produce images of well-being that cannot be satisfied by national standards of living and consumer capabilities; human rights discourse that generates demands from work forces that are repressed by state violence; ideas about gender and modernity that create large female work forces at the same time that cross-national ideologies of 'culture', 'authenticity' and national honour put increasing pressure on various communities to morally discipline these working women. Such examples could be multiplied. What they have in common is the fact that globalization produces problems which manifest themselves in local forms but have contexts which are anything but local.

In *Modernity at Large* I placed a special emphasis on the role of the imagination in social life in this era of globalization. Drawing particularly on an understanding of the global workings of media, I suggested that the imagination is now a critical part of collective, social, everyday life and is also a form of labour. That is, the everyday social life of communities throughout the world has created new resources for the workings of the imagination at all levels of the social order. Expressed most strongly in patterns of consumption, style and taste, the imagination is no longer a matter of individual genius, escapism from ordinary life or just a dimension of aesthetics. It is a faculty which informs the daily lives of ordinary people in myriad ways: it is the faculty which allows people to consider migration, to resist state violence, to seek social redress, and to design new forms of civic association and collaboration, often across national boundaries. This dimension of what I have called 'the work of the imagination' is not entirely divorced from the imagination as a creative faculty, reflected in matters of style, fashion, desire and strivings for wealth. But it is also a crucible for the everyday work of survival and reproduction. It

is the place where matters of wealth and well being, of taste and desire, of power and resistance come together. This analysis of the role of the imagination as a popular, social, collective fact in the era of globalization recognizes its split character. On the one hand, it is in and through the imagination that modern citizens are disciplined and controlled, by states, markets and other powerful interests. But it is also the faculty through which collective patterns of dissent and new designs for collective life emerge.

The final major argument of *Modernity at Large* pertains to the idea of *locality*. Today, when we hear the word global, the word local is rarely far behind. But it is not always clear what the local means, except that it is widely considered an endangered space. My main suggestion is that 'locality' is never an inert primitive or a given, which pre-exists whatever arrives from outside itself. Locality – material, social and ideological – has always had to be produced, maintained and nurtured deliberately. Thus even small-scale, customary societies are involved in the 'production of locality' against the corrosion of contingencies of every sort. The local is thus not a fact but a project. It is a particularly fragile product in an era when mass-mediation, migration and the needs of national discipline make the production of localities increasingly difficult. At the same time some of the harshest accompaniments of globalization produce forms of localization – such as refugee camps, hostels, slums and prisons – which are hardly positive.

The link between these various arguments is to suggest that if globalization is characterized by disjunctive flows, which generate acute problems of social well being, one positive force that encourages an emancipatory politics of globalization is the role of the imagination in social life. In particular where the imagination as a social force itself works across national lines to produce locality as a spatial fact and as a sensibility, we see the beginnings of social forms without either the predatory mobility of unregulated capital or the predatory stability of many states. Such social forms have barely been named by current social science, and even when named their dynamic qualities are frequently lost. Thus terms like 'international civil society' do not entirely capture

the mobility and malleability of those creative forms of social life that are localized transit points for mobile global forms of civic and civil life.

One task of a newly alert social science is to name and analyse these mobile civil forms and to rethink the meaning of research styles and networks appropriate to this mobility. In this effort, it is important to recall that the academic imagination as a force in social life is part of a wider geography of knowledge created in the dialogue between social science and area studies, particularly as they developed in the United States after the Second World War. This geography of knowledge invites us to rethink our picture of what 'regions' are and to reflect on how research itself is a special practice of the academic imagination. These two tasks are taken up in the following two sections of this article.

3. Regional worlds and area studies

As social scientists concerned with localities, circulation and comparison, we need to make a decisive shift away from what we may call 'trait' geographies to what we could call 'process' geographies. Much traditional thinking about 'areas' has been driven by conceptions of geographical, civilizational and cultural coherence which rely on some sort of trait list – of values, of languages, of material practices, of ecological adaptations, of marriage patterns and the like. However sophisticated these approaches, they all tend to see 'areas' as relatively immobile aggregates of traits, with more or less durable historical boundaries and with a unity composed of more or less enduring properties. These assumptions have often been further telescoped backwards through the lens of contemporary US security-driven images of the world and, to a lesser extent, through colonial and postcolonial conceptions of national and regional identity.

In contrast, we need an architecture for area studies which is based on process geographies, and sees significant areas of human organization as precipitates of various kinds of action, interaction and motion – trade, travel, pilgrimage, warfare, proselytization, colonization,

exile and the like. These geographies are necessarily large-scale and shifting, and their changes highlight variable congeries of language, history and material life. Put more simply, the large regions that dominate our current maps for area studies are not permanent geographical facts. They are problematic heuristic devices for the study of global geographic and cultural processes. Regions are best viewed as initial contexts for themes that generate variable geographies, rather than as fixed geographies marked by pre-given themes. These themes are equally 'real', equally coherent, but are results of our interests and not their causes.

The trouble with much of the paradigm of area studies as it now exists is that it has tended to mistake a particular configuration of *apparent* stabilities for permanent associations between space, territory and cultural organization. These apparent stabilities are themselves largely artifacts of: the specific trait-based idea of 'culture' areas; a recent Western cartography of large civilizational land-masses associated with different relationships to 'Europe' (itself a complex historical and cultural emergent); and a Cold-War based geography of fear and competition in which the study of world languages and regions in the United States was legislatively configured for security purposes into a reified map of geographical regions. As happens so often in academic inquiry, the heuristic impulse behind many of these cartographies and the contingent form of many of these spatial configurations was soon forgotten and the current maps of 'areas' in 'area studies' was enshrined as permanent.

One key to a new architecture for area studies is to recognize that the capability to imagine regions and worlds is now itself a globalized phenomenon. That is, due to the activities of migrants, media, capital, tourism etc. the means for imagining areas is now itself globally widely distributed. So, as far as possible, we need to find out how others, in what we still take to be certain areas as we define them, see the rest of the world in regional terms. In short, how does the world look – as a congeries of areas – from other locations (social, cultural, national)?

For example, the Pacific Rim is certainly a better way of thinking about a certain region today, rather than splitting up East Asia and

the Western coast of North America. But a further question is: how do people in Taiwan (China), the Republic of Korea or Japan think about the Pacific Rim if they think in those terms at all? What is *their* topology of Pacific traffic?

To seriously build an architecture for area studies around the idea that all 'areas' also conceive or produce their own 'areas', we need to recognize the centrality of this sort of recursive refraction. In fact this perspective could be infinitely regressive. But we do not have to follow it out indefinitely: one or two moves of this type would lead us a long way from the US cold war architecture with which we substantially still operate.

Following this principle has a major entailment for understanding the apparatus through which areal worlds are globally produced. This production happens substantially in the public spheres of many societies, and includes many kinds of intellectuals and 'symbolic analysts' (including artists, journalists, diplomats, businessmen and others) as well as academics. In some cases, academics may only be a small part of this world-generating optic. We need to attend to this varied set of public spheres, and the intellectuals who constitute them, to create partnerships in teaching and research so that our picture of areas does not stay confined to our own first-order, necessarily parochial, world-pictures. The potential pay-off is a critical dialogue between world-pictures, a sort of dialectic of areas and regions, built on the axiom that areas are not facts but artifacts – of our interests and our fantasies as well as of our needs to know, to remember and to forget.

But this critical dialogue between world-pictures cannot emerge without one more critical act of optical reversal. We need to ask ourselves what it means to internationalize any sort of research before we can apply our understandings to the geography of areas and regions. In essence, this means a closer look at research as a practice of the imagination.

4. The idea of research

In much recent discussion about the internationalization of research, the problem term is taken to be 'internationalization'. I argue in this section that we focus first on research, before

we worry about its global portability, its funding and about training people to do it better. The questions I wish to raise here are: What do we mean when we speak today of research? Is the research ethic, whatever it may be, essentially the same thing in the natural sciences, the social sciences and the humanities? By whatever definition, is there a sufficiently clear understanding of the research ethic in the academic world of North America and Western Europe to justify its central role in current discussions of the internationalization of academic practices?

Such a deliberately naive, anthropological reflection upon the idea of research is difficult. Like other cultural keywords, it is so much part of the ground on which we stand and the air we breathe that it resists conscious scrutiny. In the case of the idea of research, there are two additional problems. One, research is virtually synonymous with our sense of what it means to be scholars and members of the academy, and thus it has the invisibility of the obvious. Second, since research is the optic through which we typically find out about something as scholars today, it is especially hard to use research to understand research.

Partly because of this ubiquitous, taken-for-granted and axiomatic quality of research, it may be useful to look at it not historically, as we might be inclined to do, but anthropologically, as a strange and wonderful practice which transformed Western intellectual life perhaps more completely than any other single procedural idea since the Renaissance. What are the cultural presumptions of this idea and thus of its ethic? What does it seem to assume and imply? What special demands does it make upon those who buy into it?

Today, every branch of the university system in the West, but also many branches of government, law, medicine, journalism, marketing, and even the writing of some kinds of fiction and the work of the armed forces do not command serious public attention or funds before they demonstrate their foundation in research. To write the history of this huge transformation of our fundamental protocols about the production of reliable new knowledge is a massive undertaking, better suited to another occasion. For now, let us ask simply what this transformation in our understanding of new knowledge seems to assume and imply.

Veiled woman with pram, 1996. Saeed Khan/AFP

Consider a naive definition. Research may be defined as the systematic pursuit of the not-yet-known. It is usually taken for granted that the machine that produces new knowledge is research. But the research ethic is obviously not about just any kind of new knowledge. It is about new knowledge that meets certain criteria. It has to plausibly emerge from some reasonably clear grasp of relevant prior knowledge. The question of whether someone has produced new knowledge, in this sense, requires a community of assessment, usually pre-existent, vocational and specialized. This community is held to be competent to assess not just whether a piece of knowledge is actually new but whether its producer has complied with the protocols of pedigree: the review of the literature, the strategic citation, the delineation of the appropriate universe – neither shapelessly large nor myopically small – of prior, usually disciplinary knowledge. In addition, legitimate new

knowledge has to somehow strike its primary audience as interesting. That is, it has to strike them not only as adding something recognizably new to some pre-defined stock of knowledge but ideally, as adding something interesting. Of course, boring new knowledge is widely acknowledged to be a legitimate product of research, but the search for the new-and-interesting is always present in professional systems of assessment.

Reliable new knowledge, in this dispensation, cannot come *directly* out of intuition, revelation, rumour or mimicry. It has to be a product of some sort of systematic procedure. This is the nub of the strangeness of the research ethic. In the history of many world traditions (including the Western one) of reflection, speculation, argumentation and ratiocination, there has always been a place for new ideas. In several world traditions (although this is a matter of continuing debate) there has

always been a place for discovery, and even for discovery grounded in empirical observations of the world. Even in those classical traditions of intellectual work, such as those of ancient India, where there is some question about whether empirical observation of the natural world was much valued, it is recognized that a high value was placed on careful observation and recording of human activity. Thus, the great grammatical works of Panini (the father of Sanskrit grammar) are filled with observations about good and bad usage which are clearly drawn from the empirical life of speech communities. Still, it would be odd to say that Panini was conducting research on Sanskrit grammar, any more than that Augustine was conducting research on the workings of the will, or Plato on tyranny, or even Aristotle on biological structures or on politics. Yet these great thinkers certainly changed the way their readers thought and their works continue to change the way we think about these important issues. They certainly produced new knowledge and they were even systematic in the way they did it. What makes it seem anachronistic to call them researchers?

The answer lies partly in the link between new knowledge, systematicity and an organized professional community of criticism. What these great thinkers did not do was to produce new knowledge *in relation to* a prior citational world and an imagined world of *specialized* professional readers and researchers. But there is another important difference. The great thinkers, observers, discoverers, inventors and innovators of the pre-research era invariably had moral, religious, political or social projects and their exercises in the production of new knowledge were therefore, by definition, virtuoso exercises. Their protocols could not be replicated, not only for technical reasons but because their questions and frameworks were shot through with their political projects and their moral signatures. Once the age of research (and its specific modern ethic) arrives, these thinkers become necessarily confined to the proto-history of the main disciplines which now claim them, or to the footnotes of the histories of the fields into which they are seen as having trespassed. But in no case are they seen as part of the history of research, as such. This is another way to view the much discussed growth of specialized fields

of inquiry in the modern research university in the course of the 19th and 20th centuries.

These considerations bring us close to the core of the modern research ethic, to something which underpins the concern with systematicity, prior citational contexts and specialized modes of inquiry. This is the issue of replicability, or, in the aphoristic comment of my colleague George Stocking, the fact that what is involved here is not search but *re-search*. There is of course a vast technical literature in the history and philosophy of science about verifiability, replicability, falsifiability and the transparency of research protocols. All these criteria are intended to eliminate the virtuoso technique, the random flash, the generalist's epiphany, and other private sources of confidence. All confidence in this more restricted ethic of new knowledge reposes (at least in principle) in the idea that results can be repeated, sources can be checked, citations verified, calculations confirmed by one or many other researchers. Given the vested interest in showing their peers wrong, these other researchers are a sure check against bad protocols or lazy inferences. The fact that such direct cross-checking is relatively rare in the social sciences and the humanities is testimony to the abstract moral sanctions associated with the idea of replicability.

This norm of replicability gives hidden moral force to the idea, famously associated with Max Weber, of the importance of value-free research, especially in the social sciences. Once the norm of value-free research successfully moves from the natural sciences into the social and human sciences (no earlier than the late 19th century), we have a sharp line not just between such 'ancients' as Aristotle, Plato and Augustine, on the one hand and modern researchers on the other, but also a line between researchers in the strict academic sense and such modern thinkers as Goethe, Kant and Locke. The importance of value-free research in the modern research ethic assumes its full force with the subtraction of the idea of moral voice or vision and the addition of the idea of replicability. It is not difficult to see the link of these developments to the steady secularization of academic life after the 17th century.

Given these characteristics, it follows that there can be no such thing as individual research, in the strict sense, in the modern

research ethic, though of course individuals may and do conduct research. Research in the modern, Western sense, is through and through a collective activity, in which new knowledge emerges from a professionally defined field of prior knowledge and is directed towards evaluation by a specialized, usually technical, body of readers and judges, who are the first sieve through which any claim to new knowledge must ideally pass. This fact has important implications for the work of 'public' intellectuals, especially outside the West, who routinely address non-professional publics. I will address this question below. Being first and last defined by specific communities of reference (both prior and prospective), new knowledge in the modern research ethic has one other crucial characteristic that has rarely been explicitly discussed and is addressed next.

For most researchers, the trick is how to choose theories, define frameworks, ask questions and design methods that are most likely to produce research with a plausible half-life. Too grand a framework or too large a set of questions and the research is likely not to be funded, much less to produce the ideal half-life. Too myopic a framework, too detailed a set of questions, and the research is likely to be dismissed by funders as trivial, and even when it is funded, to sink without a bubble in the ocean of professional citations. The most elusive characteristic of the research ethos is this peculiar half-life of any piece of reliable new knowledge. How is it to be produced? More important, how can we produce institutions which can produce this sort of new knowledge predictably, even routinely? How do you train scholars in developing this faculty for the life-long production of pieces of new knowledge which function briskly but not for too long? Can such training be internationalized?

I have already suggested that there are few walks of modern life, both in the West and in some other advanced industrial societies, in which research is not a more or less explicit requirement of plausible policy or credible argumentation, whether the matter is child abuse or global warming, punctuated equilibrium or consumer debt, lung-cancer or affirmative action. Research-produced knowledge is everywhere, doing battle with other kinds of

knowledge (produced by personal testimony, opinion, revelation or rumour) and with other pieces of research-produced knowledge.

Though there are numerous debates and differences about research style, among natural scientists, policy-makers, social scientists and humanists, there is also a discernible area of consensus. This consensus is built around the view that the most serious problems are not those to be found at the level of theories or models but those involving method: data-gathering, sampling bias, reliability of large numerical data-sets, comparability of categories across national data archives, survey design, problems of testimony and recall, and the like. To some extent, this emphasis on method is a reaction to widespread unease about the multiplication of theoretical paradigms and normative visions, especially in the social sciences. Furthermore, in this perspective, method, translated into research design, is taken to be a reliable machine for producing ideas with the appropriate shelf-life. This implicit consensus and the differences it seeks to manage take on special importance for any effort to internationalize social science research.

5. Democracy, globalization and pedagogy

We can return now to a deeper consideration of the relationship between the knowledge of globalization and the globalization of knowledge. I have argued that globalization is not simply the name for a new epoch in the history of capital or in the biography of the nation-state. It is marked by a new role for the imagination in social life. This role has many contexts: I have focused here on the sphere of knowledge production, especially knowledge associated with systematic academic inquiry. I have suggested that the principal challenge that faces the study of regions and areas is that actors in different regions now have elaborate interests and capabilities in constructing world-pictures whose very interaction affects global processes. Thus the world may consist of regions (seen processually) but regions also imagine their own worlds. Area studies must deliberate upon this aspect of the relationship between regions, as must any social science that takes subjectivity

and ideology as something more than ephemera in the saga of capital and empire. Such deliberation is a vital prerequisite for internationalizing social science research, especially when the objects of research themselves have acquired international, transnational or global dimensions of vital interest to the social sciences.

One aspect of such deliberation involves a recognition of the constitutive peculiarities of the idea of research which itself has a rather unusual set of cultural diacritics. This ethic, as I have suggested, assumes a commitment to the routinized production of certain kinds of new knowledge, a special sense of the systematics for the production of such knowledge, a quite particular idea of the half-life of good research results, a definite sense of the specialized community of experts who precede and follow any specific piece of research, and a distinct positive valuation of the need to detach morality and political interest from properly scholarly research.

Such a deparochialization of the research ethic – of the idea of research itself – will require asking the following sorts of questions. Is there a principled way to close the gap between many US social scientists, who are suspicious of any form of applied or policy-driven research and social scientists from many other parts of the world who see themselves as profoundly involved in the social transformations sweeping their own societies? Can we retain the methodological rigour of modern social science while restoring some of the prestige and energy of earlier visions of scholarship, in which moral and political concerns were central? Can we find ways to legitimately engage scholarship by public intellectuals here and overseas whose work is not primarily conditioned by professional criteria of criticism and dissemination? What are the implications of the growing gap, in many societies, between institutions for technical training in the social sciences and broader traditions of social criticism and debate? Are we prepared to move beyond a model of internationalizing social science which is mainly concerned with improving how others practise our precepts? Is there something for us to learn from colleagues in other national and cultural settings whose work is not characterized by a sharp line between social scientific and humanistic styles of

inquiry? Asking such questions with an open mind is not just a matter of ecumenism or goodwill. It is a way of enriching the answers to questions which increasingly affect the relationship between social science research and its various constituencies here in the United States as well.

If we are serious about building a genuinely international and democratic community of researchers – especially on matters that involve cross-cultural variation and inter-societal comparison – then we have two choices. One is to take the elements that constitute the hidden armature of our research ethic as given and unquestionable, and proceed to look around for those who wish to join us. This is what may be called weak internationalization. The other is to imagine and invite a conversation about research in which, by asking the sorts of questions I have just described, the very elements of this ethic could be subjects of debate, and to which scholars from other societies and traditions of inquiry could bring their own ideas about what counts as new knowledge and about what communities of judgement and accountability they might judge to be central in the pursuit of such knowledge. This latter option – which might be called strong internationalization – might be more laborious, even contentious. But it is the surer way to create communities and conventions of research in which membership does not require unquestioned prior adherence to a quite specific research ethic. In the end, the elements that I have identified as belonging to our research ethic may well emerge from this dialogue all the more robust for having been exposed to a critical internationalism. In this sense, Western social science has nothing to fear and much to gain from principled internationalization.

It may be objected that this line of reasoning fails to recognize that all research occurs in a wider world of relations characterized by growing disparities between rich and poor countries, by increased violence and terror, by domino economic crises and by runaway traffic in drugs, arms and toxins. In a world of such overwhelming material dependencies and distortions, can any new way of envisioning research collaboration make a difference?

There are two grounds for supposing that this sort of exercise is neither idle or frivolous.

The first is that all forms of critique, including the most arcane and abstract, have the potential for changing the world: surely Marx must have believed this during his many hours in the British Museum doing 'research'. The second argument requires much fuller treatment elsewhere but can be stated here in brief. One deficit that seriously hobbles those critical voices who speak for the poor, the vulnerable, the dispossessed and the marginalized in the international fora in which global policies are made is their lack of any systematic grasp of the complexities of globalization. A new architecture for produc-

ing and sharing knowledge about globalization could provide the foundations of a pedagogy which closes this gap and helps to democratize the flow of knowledge about globalization itself. Such a pedagogy would create new forms of dialogue between academics, public intellectuals, activists and policy-makers in different societies and its principles would require significant innovations. This vision of *global* collaborative teaching and learning about globalization may not resolve the great antinomies of power that characterize this world but it might help to even the playing field.

Note

* This article draws on three sources: an unpublished memo prepared for the Ford Foundation called 'Philanthropy in Motion: Grantmaking in the Era of Globalization' (February 1998); an

essay entitled 'The Research Ethic and the Spirit of Internationalism' published in *Items* (Social Science Research Council, New York, Vol. 51, No. 4, Part I, December 1997); and the author's

contributions to a White Paper produced by the 'Regional Worlds Project' at the University of Chicago under the title 'Area Studies, Regional Worlds' (June 1997).

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